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The Objects of Thought.  By TIM CRANE. (Oxford University Press, 2013.  Pp xii + 182.  Price 
£27.50.)  
 
The problem of what to make of thoughts and other mental states that get characterised as Ôabout 
HamletÕ, Ôabout PegasusÕ and in general Ôabout things that donÕt existÕ is the focus of Tim CraneÕs 
new book The Objects of Thought (TOT).  Crane aims to give an account of these mental states that 
respects their similarity to mental states that are about real entities.  It is of crucial importance that this 
aim is realisable, if a proper understanding of the aboutness of mental states - of intentionality (for 
Crane the mark of the mental) - is to be achieved.  The phrase Ôthoughts and other mental states that 
get characterised as Òabout HamletÓÕ (let me for shorten this to ÔHamlet-thoughtsÕ) is my attempt at a 
specification of the subject matter of TOT that doesnÕt assume the position that Crane argues for - that 
there is something, Hamlet, that Hamlet-thoughts are about.   
ÔThe best phenomenological account of intentionalityÕ (p. 5) Crane says, entails there are non-existent 
objects of thought, like Hamlet and Pegasus, and truths about these.  (These truths include ÔPegasus is 
a mythical horseÕ but not ÔPegasus is a horseÕ; there is no such horse (p. 62).) Let me call the denial 
that there is something, Hamlet, that Hamlet-thoughts are about ÔeliminativismÕ.  Crane is not an 
eliminativist in this sense but he is also not, or doesnÕt want to be, what Mark Sainsbury calls an 
ÔexoticistÕ ((2010) ÔIntentionality without ExoticaÕ in Jeshion, Robin, New Essays on Singular 
Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press)).  A Hamlet-thought, he is adamant, does not relate the 
thinker to some kind of ÔexoticÕ item.  Aboutness is not a Ôreal relationÕ (p. 9). Having defended, in 
the first part of TOT, the ÔtruismsÕ that eliminativists deny, in the second part Crane offers ÔreductiveÕ 
explanations of the Ôtruths about non-existent objects... in terms of truths about existing thingsÕ (p. 5). 
TOT is an attempt to carve out a new position between eliminativism and exoticism, and finally solve 
Ôthe problem of nonexistenceÕ (p. 3). 
This is a bold ambition and TOT is a brilliant attempt to pull it off - ingenious, full of insight and 
wonderfully clearly written.  The worry I will express in this review is that there just isnÕt space 
between eliminativism and exoticism for another position.   
Crane uses names like ÔHamletÕ in the subject position of statements, and says things like: Ôthere are 
non-existent objects of thoughtÕ.  Does this not make him an exoticist?  Crane maintains not.  He 
denies that quantifying over non-existent objects commits him to such items; that is he rejects QuineÕs 
criterion of ontological commitment.  In support of this rejection he points to the use of Ôpossible 
worlds talkÕ by metaphysicians who deny a commitment to possible worlds (pp. 40-41).  This makes 
the deniable assumption that metaphysicians express themselves strictly and literally in these cases.  
But Crane says a lot more in defense of and explanation of his rejection of QuineÕs criterion in chapter 
2Õs discussion of quantification and ontological commitment.  
The Ôexistential quantificationÕ Ôthere are FsÕ is true just if the Ôdomain of quantificationÕ contains 
items that satisfy ÔFÕ.  How then can Crane deny that in endorsing Ôthere are FsÕ I am committing 
myself to Fs?  He claims: 
The semantics for the quantifiers in a given language will be given in a metalanguage, and the 
domains will standardly be introduced by metalanguage quantifiers. There is no semantic or 
logical obstacle to seeing these quantifiers as Ônon-committingÕ just as the object-language 
quantifiers are (p. 37). 
The domain of quantification specified by the semantics for my language, Crane says, is the Ôuniverse 
of discourse  ... a specific generalization of the idea of an object of thought: viz. all the things relevant 
to what we are talking aboutÕ (p. 40).  Non-existent objects like Pegasus Ôcan be ÒvaluesÓ of the 
variables bound by the quantifiers, just in the sense that things can be true or false of these objects of 
thoughtÕ (p. 40). 
This is why Crane feels free to quantify over non-existent intentional objects and why he maintains 
that he isnÕt thereby committed to exoticism.  But can he explicitly reject exoticism?  His denial that 
there are such existing things as Hamlet and Pegasus is compatible with many versions of exoticism, 
as is his denial that non-existent objects have real (one place) properties.  Much of what is asserted by 
the ÔreductiveÕ explanations of the Ôtruths about non-existentsÕ that Crane offers in the second part of 
TOT, is compatible with certain varieties of exoticism.  According to CraneÕs explanation ÔHolmes is 
famousÕ is true because Holmes possesses the Ôrepresentation dependent propertyÕ (p. 135) of fame.  
Holmes having this property in turn is explained as down to the ubiquity of Holmes-representations.  
The ultimate explanans in the explanations are facts about real peopleÕs mental states but this is not 
incompatible with what an exoticist like Amie Thomasson ((1999) Fiction and Metaphysics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)), who takes the Ôabstract artefactÕ Holmes to ÔdependÕ on 
concrete mental states, would say.  Thomasson could go along with CraneÕs story, disagreeing only 
when it comes to the identity conditions of Holmes-representations and of Holmes.     
For Crane, crucially, Holmes doesnÕt have identity conditions (and so the identity of Holmes-
representations canÕt depend on Holmes).  Crane makes explicit his rejection of exoticism by denying 
that there are any facts about the (numerical) identity of non-existent objects of thought.  Crane also 
makes explicit his denial of exoticism by denying that non-existent objects of thought stand in any 
Ôreal relationsÕ.  Reference, unlike aboutness, is a real relation (p. 9), so Crane denies that ÔHolmesÕ 
refers.  In the remainder of this review I will argue that there are difficulties attending these denials. 
First, the denial that names like ÔHolmesÕ refer.  It is puzzling how this squares with what TOT says 
about the semantics of talk Ôabout non-existent objectsÕ.  Remember, the metalanguage in which we 
talk about reference and other semantic notions like truth, is supposedly non-committing.  So there 
seems to be nothing stopping me from saying that ÔHolmes is famousÕ, which for Crane is literally 
true (his reductive explanation doesnÕt deny this), is true just if the member of the domain of 
quantification that ÔHolmesÕ refers to satisfies Ôis famousÕ.   
The only thing stopping me saying this is CraneÕs ÔstipulationÕ (p. 10) that reference is a relation of 
words to real existent entities.  If this prevents me from using the word ÔreferenceÕ though, I can 
employ KripkeÕs device and use the word ÔschmeferenceÕ.  It will become apparent that schmeference 
is just what we mean by ÔreferenceÕ.  It seems that Crane needs to reject the semantic conception of 
truth that accords reference the role it plays in the above explanation of the truth of ÔHolmes is 
famousÕ.   
Let me turn to the denial that there are facts about the (numerical) identity of non-existent objects.  
What to make then of, for example, ÔMercury and Hermes are the same (mythical) god?Õ  Crane says:   
My proposal is that what is at issue in cases of mere intentional identity is not identity at all, 
but similarity of representation. We can talk about sameness and difference here, but what 
makes this talk true, when it is true, is the similarity or sameness of properties. We count 
Mercury and Hermes as the ÔsameÕ god, because the stories that are told about them are 
relevantly similar: they say similar things about these two characters. (p. 164) 
Crane addresses the troublesome case of differently represented characters that we count as Ôthe sameÕ 
(e.g. Clark Kent and Superman); we count them as the same, he says, because the story says they are 
identical.  Another case that spells trouble for the suggestion that ÔsameÕ in the relevant contexts 
means Ôsimilarly representedÕ is the case of two similarly represented characters (mythical gods, say) 
who belong to myths that donÕt have a common historical origin, or who belong to fictions developed 
independently by different authors with no common influence (cf. Thomasson 1999).  Imagine the 
two characters were first believed to have a common origin and then it is discovered that they donÕt.  
The judgement that they are the same (mythical) god is revised without the representations of the 
characters changing. 
Also consider, if Crane is right that, because they lack identity, we canÕt count non-existents, then 
statements like: Ômost of Jane AustenÕs characters are unappealingÕ canÕt be included among Ôthe 
truths about non-existentsÕ (alongside e.g. ÔSiegfried is an unappealing characterÕ (cf. p. 20)) without 
inflicting the sort of violence to their intuitive semantics that Crane avoids in other cases.   
I conclude that there are reasons to doubt that Crane has solved the problem of non-existence.  But 
that doesnÕt mean TOT is not a landmark contribution to the debate.  And there is so much in the book 
(for instance the discussion of Ôsingular thoughtÕ) that demands to be read by anyone who would wish 
to enquire into all the issues that Crane explores. 
